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Management Teams’ Regulatory Foci and Organizational Units’ 
Exploratory Innovation: The Mediating Role of Coordination Mechanisms 
 
 
Abstract 
We further current understanding about the role of management teams in driving exploratory 
innovation by proposing that the regulatory focus of an organizational unit's management 
team is a key antecedent of the unit's level of exploratory innovation, and by clarifying the 
organizational coordination mechanisms through which this antecedent generates the unit’s 
exploratory innovation. Our results, based on a survey of 748 managers from 69 
organizational units of a large multinational semiconductor company, indicate that the 
promotion focus of a unit’s management team relates positively to the unit’s exploratory 
innovation. In contrast, prevention focus has a marginal negative effect. These effects are 
mediated by the management team’s use of decentralization and connectedness. Our research 
advances theory development regarding the micro-foundations of organizational innovation 
and increases our understanding of how the views of a unit’s management team are reflected 
in the unit’s level of exploratory innovation and therefore impact the unit’s chances of 
survival. 
Keywords: Exploratory innovation, management team, organizational coordination, 
regulatory focus 
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INTRODUCTION 
Exploratory innovation builds on new organizational knowledge and requires a 
departure from existing skills and capabilities (Alexiev, Jansen, van den Bosch and Volberda, 
2010; Benner and Tushman, 2003; Sidhu, Volberda and Commandeur, 2004). In changing 
environments, exploratory innovation is an essential means to increase organizations’ 
performance and chances of survival (Govindarajan, Kopalle and Danneels, 2011; Nerkar, 
2003; Phelps, 2010; Smith, Binns and Tushman, 2010). However, for a variety of reasons, 
management teams may be reluctant to let their organizational units engage in high levels of 
exploratory innovation. For instance, they may dislike the uncertainty of its returns (Zhang, 
Baden-Fuller and Pool, 2011), they may be subject to short-term efficiency pressures from 
financial analysts (Benner and Ranganathan, 2012), or they may not be willing to face the 
difficulties required for developing the new knowledge and capabilities (Dougherty and 
Hardy, 1996). As a result, the impact of the management team on the pursuit of exploratory 
innovation has emerged as an important research theme (Alexiev et al., 2010; Kristinsson, 
Candi and Saemundsson, 2016). 
 Current studies in the upper-echelon literature (Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick and Mason, 
1984) that seek to explain the impact of senior management teams on innovation have typically 
focused on their demographic attributes (Daellenbach, McCarthy and Schoenecker, 1999; 
Papadakis and Barwise, 2002; Talke, Salomo and Kock, 2011). However, recently, scholars 
have argued that psychological attributes of managerial decision makers may have a more 
profound impact on firm action as they are more directly linked to human behavior and 
decision-making (Antonakis, Day and Schyns, 2012; Carpenter, Geletkanycz and Sanders, 
2004; Gamache, McNamara, Mannor and Johnson, 2015). In line with this, studies have started 
to examine senior managements’ psychological characteristics may relate to organizational 
outcomes. Examples include the effect of senior managers’ personality traits on organizational 
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adaptation (Arnulf, 2012), the impact of CEO narcissism on takeover processes (Aktas, de 
Bodt, Bollaert and Roll, 2016), and the influence of top management team reflexivity on new 
product performance (MacCurtain, Flood, Ramamoorthy, West and Dawson, 2010).  
Yet, theory development regarding how psychological attributes of a management team 
can drive exploratory innovation is scarce. Research typically argues that increasing market or 
technological discontinuities require the management team of an organizational unit to decide 
to increase exploratory innovation (Dowell and Swaminathan, 2006; Govindarajan et al., 2011; 
Nerkar, 2003). However, some studies have indicated that some management teams fail to do 
so, and consequently, put their units’ chances of survival at risk (Jansen, Vera and Crossan, 
2009; Kaplan, Murray and Henderson, 2003). Therefore, a better understanding of the upper-
echelon-level psychological antecedents of exploratory innovation is necessary. In this paper, 
we argue that regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997, 1998) may be a powerful theory for 
better explaining why a management team increases exploratory innovation. By building upon 
the regulatory focus theory, we contribute by advancing theory development about how the 
management team of an organizational unit impacts the level of exploratory innovation of the 
unit, and provide new insights about why some management teams may decide to increase 
exploratory innovation, while others may not, or even decide to decrease it, despite being a part 
of the same industry or firm. 
 Regulatory focus is a motivational theory of goal pursuit, rapidly becoming prominent 
in the management and organization literatures (e.g., Das and Kumar, 2010; Kark and van Dijk, 
2007; McMullen, Shepherd and Patzelt, 2009; Spanjol, Tam, Qualls and Bohlmann, 2011; 
Weber, Mayer and Macher, 2011). Regulatory focus shapes people’s decision making and how 
they then act; it is, for instance, a powerful antecedent of strategic inclinations (Crowe and 
Higgins, 1997), preferences (Wang and Lee, 2006), and behavioral change (i.e. Zhao and 
Pechmann, 2007). Prior research suggests that engagement in exploratory behaviors is 
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determined by the forces of attraction to novelty and fear of threat (Bergman and Kitchen, 
2009; Berlyne, 1966; Brown and Nemes, 2008). According to regulatory focus theory, 
receptiveness to novelty, risk-taking and change are regulated by the promotion focus, the 
mechanism for maximizing gains and seeking pleasure (Crowe and Higgins, 1997; 
Herzenstein, Posavac and Brakus, 2007; Liberman, Idson, Camacho and Higgins, 1999; 
McMullen et al., 2009). In contrast, prevention focus, the mechanism for minimizing losses 
and avoiding pain, emphasizes risk-avoidance and stability and favors what has been 
previously tried over novelty (ibid.).  
To date, research on regulatory focus concentrates on individual-level outcomes. Hence, 
an understanding of the mechanisms by which managers’ regulatory foci may affect higher-
level outcomes, such as a unit’s exploratory innovation, is limited (Gamache et al., 2015; Kark 
and Van Dijk, 2007). We contribute to enriching such understanding by investigating the 
mediating role of coordination mechanisms. Studies on innovation argue that an important way 
by which senior managers may exert influence on organizational innovation is by putting in 
place coordination mechanisms (Cardinal, 2001). Traditionally, this literature highlights the 
importance of formal structural mechanisms (Damanpour, 1991), most notably centralization 
(Boumgarden, Nickerson and Zenger, 2012; Miller and Dröge, 1986; Tsai, 2002; Zmud, 1982), 
by which a management team can coordinate the development of different levels and types of 
innovation. More recently, others have pointed to the value of more informal and voluntary 
modes of coordination, such as personal relationships between people, which cut through 
hierarchical levels and functions (Jansen, van den Bosch and Volberda, 2006; Tsai, 2002). 
However, whether and how a management team can exert influence on such informal and 
voluntary personal connections remains unclear (Adler, Know and Heckscher, 2008; Mom, van 
den Bosch and Volberda, 2009). Moreover, empirically validated insights into how the different 
types of coordination mechanisms, i.e., formal and informal, foster exploratory innovation are 
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scarce (Lawson, Petersen, Cousins and Handfield, 2009; Jansen et al., 2006). Hence, to advance 
current insights into why and how a management team affects exploratory innovation, we 
contribute not only by introducing the regulatory focus of the unit’s management team as a 
new antecedent of the unit’s exploratory innovation but also by investigating the mediating 
roles of two different types of coordination mechanisms, namely through formal coordination 
mechanisms, such as centralization, and through connectedness, such as the informal lateral 
relationships among the members of the unit. 
 Finally, in the regulatory focus literature, there have been numerous studies showing 
the effect of organizational context on the individual or group (i.e. Brockner and Higgins, 2001; 
Rietzschel, 2011). In contrast, we extend the recent dialogue by suggesting that, when the group 
possesses sufficient power or authority, such as the power and authority a management team 
has in its organizational unit, it can shape the organizational context, and in particular, the 
coordination mechanisms of the unit in line with its regulatory foci. This finding is particularly 
useful for the emerging stream of literature aiming to better understand the diffusion of a 
particular regulatory focus throughout the organization (e.g. McMullen et al., 2009). 
 The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First, we introduce the regulatory 
focus theory and develop the hypotheses. After that, we outline data collection and scales, 
following which we present the results from a survey of 748 managers from 69 organizational 
units of a large multinational semiconductor company. Finally, we discuss the implications of 
our study, and point towards areas of future research. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Regulatory Focus Theory and Exploratory Innovation 
 In the psychology literature, there are two kinds of ends an individual may struggle to 
attain; avoiding pain and seeking pleasure, and “this principle underlies motivational models 
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across all levels of analysis in psychology, from the biological to the social” (Higgins 1998: 1). 
On the other hand, the regulatory focus theory differs from its predecessors as it posits that 
avoiding pain and seeking pleasure are not the two extremes of a continuum, but are two 
separate mechanisms (i.e. orthogonal). According to this theory, all individuals try to both avoid 
pain and seek pleasure, although to differing extents (Tuncdogan, van den Bosch & Volberda, 
2015). When individuals are focused more on prevention, they try to minimize mistakes by 
concentrating in detail on the threats in the environment, and becoming 'appropriate' within the 
norms (Förster and Higgins, 2005; Friedman and Förster, 2001; Pennington and Roese, 2003; 
Semin, Higgins, Gil, Estourget and Valencia, 2005). In contrast, when they are focused more 
on promotion, they try to maximize gains by seizing opportunities in the environment (ibid.). 
Regulatory focus literature discusses the various factors surrounding this essential principle, 
which has crucial effects on behavioral, emotional and decision-making tendencies (cf. 
Brockner and Higgins, 2001; Wang and Lee, 2006; Zhao and Pechmann, 2007). 
A few years ago, using insights from the social identity and social categorization 
theories (i.e. Hogg and Terry, 2000), Faddegon, Ellemers and Scheepers (2008) have extended 
the regulatory focus theory beyond the individual level of analysis. In particular, they used the 
idea of multiple selves (i.e. the individual self and the collective self) in order to show that not 
only individuals, but collective bodies such as teams can have a regulatory focus as well. 
Indeed, through a series of experiments, they were able to show that individuals are quite 
cognizant of the regulatory focus of their group, and act accordingly. More recently, a number 
of papers have examined the impacts of regulatory focus at different levels of analyses, such 
as the team or organization levels (e.g. Das and Kumar, 2010; Rietzschel, 2011; Spanjol et al. 
2011). In this paper, we are interested in the regulatory focus of the management team of an 
organizational unit, and the associations with the unit’s level of exploratory innovation. 
 Exploratory innovation is a high-risk activity that builds on new knowledge and can 
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produce radical change, maximizing gains in the long-term (Alexiev et al., 2010; Benner and 
Tushman, 2003; Nerkar, 2003; Tushman and O'Reilly, 1996). Engagement in exploratory 
activities is governed by the attraction to novelty and the fear of threat (i.e. Bergman and 
Kitchen, 2009; Berlyne, 1966; Brown and Nemes, 2008). The promotion focus – the novelty 
and eagerness components of regulatory focus – of a unit’s management team may increase the 
unit’s tendency towards exploratory innovation as it can be expected to increase the 
management team’s willingness to take risk (Crowe and Higgins, 1997; Hamstra, Bolderdijk 
and Veldstra, 2011), enlarge its preference for novelty (Herzenstein et al., 2007), change 
(Liberman et al., 1999), and new knowledge creation (Friedman and Förster, 2001; Rietzschel, 
2011) and foster a forward-looking orientation (Pennington and Roese, 2003). On the other 
hand, the prevention focus – the fear and vigilance components of regulatory focus – of a unit’s 
management team may inhibit exploratory innovation by the unit as it tries to protect the group 
from potential threats by keeping the risks down (Crowe and Higgins, 1997; Hamstra et al., 
2011), and as it can be expected to increase the management team’s willingness to maintain the 
status quo and to keep stability (Liberman et al., 1999) and also its preference for reliable and 
known outcomes (Hamstra et al. 2011). Based on this, we propose the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: (a) The promotion focus of the unit’s management team is positively related to 
the unit’s exploratory innovation, and (b) the prevention focus of the unit’s management team 
is negatively related to the unit’s exploratory innovation. 
 
Management Team Regulatory Focus and Organizational Antecedents of Exploratory 
Innovation 
Connectedness is the extent to which members of the organizational unit, regardless of 
their hierarchical level or function, are accessible to and interlinked with each other through 
direct personal contacts. Prevention-focused individuals are detail-oriented and concentrate 
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mainly on minimizing losses (Crowe and Higgins, 1997; Förster and Higgins, 2005). 
Furthermore, they tend to be task-oriented in their supervisions of others (Kark and van Dijk, 
2007). Moreover, because they value concrete goals (ibid.) and focus on short-term 
performance (i.e. Pennington and Roese, 2003), prevention-focused management teams may 
perceive the essential elements of connectedness, such as informal hall talk, as time-wasting, 
and may take precautions against it. Therefore, prevention-focused management teams1 are 
more likely to assign to members of the organizational unit specific tasks, the boundaries of 
which are clear. In contrast, promotion-focused management teams, in line with their cognitive 
processing styles (i.e. Förster and Higgins, 2005; Semin et al., 2005), are more likely to assign 
abstract, general tasks with unclear boundaries, which require employees to work together and 
consult each other informally. Therefore, we expect a management team’s promotion focus to 
have a positive association with levels of connectedness in the organizational unit, and 
prevention focus to have a negative association with it. 
Connectedness has a positive association with the exploratory innovation of the 
organizational unit, especially because it helps unit members combine knowledge and develop 
new knowledge that underlies exploratory innovation (Björk and Magnusson, 2009; Jansen et 
al., 2006; Obstfeld, 2005). An increased level of information sharing resulting from a well-
connected organizational unit is likely to increase exploratory innovation in at least two ways. 
First, information sharing among group members is associated with creativity and new idea 
generation (e.g., Mom, van den Bosch and Volberda, 2007; Paulus and Yang, 2000; Wu and 
Fang, 2010). Second, it is likely to increase the implementation success of the generated ideas. 
For instance, a new idea engendered at the lower levels of the organization is more likely to be 
adopted if the individuals at these levels already have links with or are at least allowed to easily 
                                                          
1 Within the context of this text, the phrases 'promotion-focused management teams' and 'prevention-focused 
management teams' will be used interchangeably with the phrases 'management teams in a promotion focus' and 
'management teams in a prevention focus'. 
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reach the ones at higher hierarchical levels (Floyd and Lane, 2000). By contrast, when 
connectedness within the organizational unit is lacking, individuals are limited mainly to their 
own knowledge and capacity to generate new ideas, not to mention that their lack of networking 
may mean that the novel ideas they find may not necessarily fit the needs of the organizational 
unit. Moreover, even if they happen to find a useful idea, they may fail to mobilize enough 
people to actually develop it further.  
Hypothesis 2: (a) The promotion focus of the unit’s management team is positively related to 
the level of connectedness in the organizational unit, and (b) the prevention focus of the unit’s 
management team is negatively related to the level of connectedness in the organizational unit, 
where (c) the level of connectedness is positively related to the level of exploratory innovation. 
  
Centralization/decentralization refers to the extent to which the management team 
delegates decision making authority to other individuals in the organizational unit, i.e. to 
employees and managers lower down the hierarchy. Decentralization gives management teams 
the opportunity to focus their limited attention on broader issues (i.e. Ocasio, 1997; Raisch, 
2008; Welch, 1984), by handing other issues over to expert and specialized employees (i.e. 
Colombo and Delmastro, 2004). On the other hand, as in any agency problem, decentralization 
comes with the risk that, intentionally or unintentionally, the agent may not act in the preferred 
manner (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989). For instance, unethical pro-self behavior in mixed-motive 
situations (i.e. De Cremer and van Knippenberg, 2002), ranging from basic cases of free-riding 
(i.e. Kerr, 1983) to organized corruption (i.e. Celentani and Ganuza, 2002), is known to have 
detrimental effects on organizational performance. In other words, when employees are given 
more power for them to engage in innovative activities, management has relatively less control 
regarding whether those innovative activities will be targeted for the benefit of the organization 
or the employee’s own benefit. We expect the regulatory focus of the management team to 
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influence the extent to which the management team is willing to take the risk of delegating a 
task, in exchange for potential benefits. Crowe and Higgins explain that “the promotion focus 
inclination is to insure hits and insure against errors of omission, whereas the prevention focus 
inclination is to insure correct rejections and insure against errors of commission” (1997, p. 
117). Therefore, because they concentrate more on the gains side of the equation, we anticipate 
promotion-focused management teams to have a higher likelihood of delegating tasks and 
authority to other individuals. In contrast, in an effort to minimize mistakes and unexpected 
behavior, prevention-focused management teams are more likely to keep the decision making 
authority central to themselves. 
In turn, the influence of a management team’s regulatory focus on (de)centralization is 
likely to affect the exploratory innovation level of the organizational unit. More specifically, 
for at least three reasons, the level of centralization is likely to be negatively associated with 
exploratory innovation. First, exploratory innovation requires non-routine problem solving and 
deviation from existing knowledge (Benner and Tushman, 2003; Jansen et al., 2006). By 
contrast, in centralized decision making, the number and quality of solutions to the problems 
faced by the organization are reduced (Sheremata, 2000), and so too is the likelihood that unit 
members will seek new knowledge and come up with new ideas (Damanpour, 1991). Second, 
in a centralized environment, the speed of decision making at lower levels is greatly reduced, 
not only because every decision has to go higher up the ranks, but also because the flow of so 
much information keeps top management under constant information overload (e.g., Hitt and 
Brynjolfsson, 1997; Graham, Harvey and Puri, 2015). As a result, the total number of 
exploratory innovative activities that the unit can engage in is decreased; innovation 
opportunities are also regularly missed because of changes in the external environment (e.g., 
Zehir and Özşahin, 2008). Finally, a decreased perceived ability to accomplish a task is known 
to be associated with a lower intention to engage in that task (e.g., Ajzen, 1991). Therefore, in 
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a centralized environment, individuals who are at lower levels of the organizational hierarchy 
may less likely attempt to innovate because they have less of a say (i.e. discretion) on whether 
their innovative ideas will actually be appreciated and adopted. 
Hypothesis 3: (a) The promotion focus of the unit’s management team is negatively related to 
the level of centralization in the organizational unit, and (b) the prevention focus of the unit’s 
management team is positively related to the level of centralization in the organizational unit, 
where (c) the level of centralization is negatively related to the level of exploratory innovation. 
 
According to upper-echelons theory, the management team reflects its strategic 
inclinations, intentions, and preferences upon the organization and its outcomes through 
organizational design decisions (Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Centralization 
is considered by many as the most important formal organizational coordination mechanism, 
whereas connectedness is considered one of the most important informal mechanisms (i.e., 
Tsai, 2002). Hence, we expect that the regulatory focus of the managing team of the 
organizational unit is, to some extent, reflected upon the exploratory innovation of the 
organizational unit through these two organizational coordination mechanisms. Furthermore, 
considering that in upper-echelons theory, organization design is a key activity of the managing 
team, we expect that the two key organizational coordination mechanisms will capture most of 
the effect of the managing team’s regulatory focus on the organizational unit’s exploratory 
innovation. 
Hypothesis 4: As key organizational coordination mechanisms, centralization and connected-
ness mediate the relation between the regulatory focus of a management team and the 
organizational unit’s exploratory innovation. 
 
------------------------------ 
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Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Data Collection and Validation 
 Exploratory innovation is particularly important for organizational units that are based 
in fast-changing, dynamic environments, such as high-tech industries. In line with this, we 
decided to collect our data at a large, multi-unit, multinational semiconductor company. The 
company employs approximately 25,000 people and is headquartered in Europe. The company 
has 43 product lines, some of which consist of up to three organizational units in different 
geographical regions, resulting in a total of 95 organizational units. Each product line’s 
management team is responsible for the organizational units associated with them. The survey 
was sent to all 2,275 managers – i.e. to those who belonged to the product lines’ management 
teams as well as to all those in the levels below the team – of all organizational units. Of the 
responses we received from all 43 units, each of which had up to three organizational units in 
different geographical regions, resulting in a total of 95 organizational units. Next, we removed 
the responses with missing variables and, for reliability purposes, the 24 organizational units 
which had only one respondent. This brought us to our net sample size of 748 managers from 
69 organizational units. Then, to rate the management team’s promotion and prevention foci, 
we used responses from the top managers, who are either part of a management team or are in 
closest contact with the team, and therefore, have a realistic opinion of the team’s regulatory 
focus. Only when data from these top managers was not available, we used middle-managers’ 
responses. We used all managers’ responses in rating the coordination mechanisms and 
exploratory innovation. Using a relatively different set of respondents for the independent and 
dependent variable was also beneficial because doing so is known to help reduce potential 
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issues pertaining to common method bias. 
We conducted convergent and discriminant validity checks as well as reliability checks 
on all the items and scales within the study. The items of each scale showed high levels of 
reliability (reported below), which allowed us to aggregate the items to form the variables. We 
also checked the average deviance (AD) averages to see whether the managers were in 
agreement on the levels of the variables. These scores were lower than 1.2 for each scale, 
showing a sufficient level of agreement between the raters (Brown and Hauenstein, 2005; 
Burke and Dunlap, 2002), so we aggregated the data for the individual managers to the 
corresponding 69 organizational units. Following that we conducted an exploratory factor 
analysis (Principle Components Analysis, Varimax rotation with Kaiser Normalization) in 
which we included all items of this study’s constructs, i.e. those measuring exploratory 
innovation, promotion focus, prevention focus, decentralization, and connectedness. Keiser-
Meyer-Olkin measure was larger than .5 (KMO = .763) and Bartlett’s test of sphericity was 
significant (χ2 = 962.04; p < .001), showing that the sample was appropriate for exploratory 
factor analysis. Five distinct factors emerged with eigenvalues greater than 1. Only the item 
‘Show a firm belief in “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it’ loaded lower than 0.6 on its corresponding 
factor and was removed from further analysis. The items of the scales and the rotated 
component matrix of the exploratory factor analysis with the model variables are presented in 
Table 1. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
 
 Next, we conducted a series of factor analyses to see which one best fits the structure 
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of our data. The first model assumed that the five factors are all distinct from each other, the 
second one combined promotion and prevention foci, the third one also combined 
connectedness and centralization, the fourth combined all except exploratory innovation and 
the fifth combined all five factors (See Table 2). Of these five models, both in terms of more 
absolute measures such as χ2 / d.f., TLI and CFI and in terms of comparative measures such as 
AIC, BIC and SABIC, the five-factor model fared better than all other alternatives, and showed 
satisfactory fit. 
After that, we tested a sixth model, where we employed item-parcels. CFA models tend 
to show lower fit when there are relatively many items and the sample size is small (e.g., n = 
69). One technique commonly employed in management research to reduce this problem is the 
use of item-parcels (e.g., Liu, Hui, Lee and Chen, 2013; Wu, Kwan, Wei and Liu, 2013). In 
this technique, the highest and lowest loading items of each factor are averaged, followed by 
the next highest and lowest, to decrease the total number of items (See Liu, Hui, Lee and Chen, 
2013, p. 1002 for a more elaborate discussion). While the fit of five-factor model was adequate 
without the use of item-parcels, after using them, all of the fit indices improved further (See 
Table 2 below). 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------ 
 
Scales and Measurement 
 Dependent Variable. For the dependent variable, exploratory innovation, we used the 
scale devised and used by Jansen et al. (2006), which has also been applied by others such as 
Alexiev et al., (2010). The scale (α = .91) captures the extent to which the organizational unit 
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departs from existing knowledge and pursues innovations for new customers or markets. 
 Independent Variable. Scales for assessing the regulatory foci of management teams 
are not yet available in the literature. Based on studies which integrate theories on leadership 
behavior with regulatory focus theory, we constructed an initial management team regulatory 
focus scale based on items relating to the leadership behaviors of the management team that 
indicated promotion and prevention focus (cf. Bass, 1997; Bass, Avolio, Jung and Berson, 
2003; Ho, Fie, Ching, and Boon, 2009; Kark and Van Dijk, 2007; Neubert, Kacmar, Carison, 
Chonko and Roberts, 2008; Phipps and Hayashi, 2005). During subsequent interviews, 
managers were asked to evaluate the survey items and suggest improvements. To allow further 
enhancement of the reliability, unidimensionality, and convergent and discriminant validity of 
the promotion and prevention scales, we tested the scales quantitatively, drawing on data we 
obtained from a test version of the survey with 34 managers from the semiconductor company. 
Following reliability and validity analyses, ambiguous items were identified and excluded, a 
process that resulted in the final version of the scales. 
In line with regulatory focus theory, the promotion dimension of the regulatory focus 
scale captures the behavioral manifestations of the unit’s management teams in terms of their 
receptiveness to change and novelty, as well as their orientation towards the future and to 
achieving gains (e.g. Friedman and Förster, 2001; Higgins, 2001; Kark and van Dijk, 2007; 
Liberman et al., 1999). In particular, the item “Suggest new ways of looking at how to complete 
assignments” is an indicator of promotion focus, as it shows willingness towards change 
(Liberman et al., 1999), creativity (Friedman and Förster, 2001) and novelty (Herzenstein et 
al., 2007). Likewise, “Seek differing perspectives when solving problems” is an indicator of 
promotion focus as well, for the very same reasons. The item “Talk enthusiastically about what 
needs to be accomplished” indicates promotion focus, as cheerfulness, enthusiasm and 
eagerness feelings are associated with making gains and promotion focus (Brockner and 
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Higgins, 2001; Higgins, 2001). “Articulate a compelling vision of the future” measures the 
future orientation of the management team, which is again a characteristic of promotion focus 
(Mogilner, Aaker and Pennington, 2008; Pennington and Roese, 2003). 
In line with regulatory focus theory, the prevention dimension of the regulatory focus 
scale captures the behavioral manifestations of the unit management teams, showing any 
orientation towards suppressing change and deviations as well as towards preserving the status 
quo and minimizing mistakes and losses (e.g. Friedman and Förster, 2001; Higgins, 2001; Kark 
and van Dijk, 2007; Liberman et al., 1999). The items “Concentrate their attention on dealing 
with mistakes, complaints and failures” and “Focus attention on irregularities, mistakes, 
exceptions, and deviations from standards” are typical prevention focus items, as the core 
characteristic of prevention focus is minimizing losses (Higgins, 1997; Crowe and Higgins, 
1997) and preserving the status quo through suppressing deviations from the standards 
(Liberman et al., 1999). “Do not hesitate to interfere until problems become serious” is a 
prevention focused item, as one marking feature of prevention focus is quickly realizing 
impending threats in the environment, and taking preventative action (Friedman and Förster, 
2001; Higgins, 1997). For instance, individuals in a prevention focus are found to use brakes 
much faster when driving (Werth and Förster, 2007). Finally, “Show a firm belief in 'if it ain’t 
broke, don’t fix it'” is a prevention focused item, as individuals in a prevention focus 
concentrate on minimizing losses (Crowe and Higgins, 1997), and thus, if an issue or object is 
not particularly causing problems, prevention focused individuals will not be easily motivated 
to make changes to it. On the other hand, the prospects of making gains from deviations from 
standard motivate individuals in a promotion focus, as their primary strategic inclination is 
maximizing gains. For instance, Liberman and colleagues (1999) found that prevention focused 
individuals are much less likely than promotion focused individuals to engage in endowment 
or task substitution. However, as mentioned previously, the factor analysis suggested that the 
 17 
 
loading of this item on prevention focus dimension was not high enough (Table 1), and this 
item was removed from further analysis. 
Both the promotion and prevention dimensions of the regulatory focus scale showed 
high levels of reliability: promotion α = .86; prevention α = .82. Exploratory factor analyses 
(Table 1) and confirmatory factor analyses (Table 2) indicate good convergent and discriminant 
validity of the promotion and prevention scales and their items.   
Finally, to further examine post-hoc the validity of the regulatory focus scale, we 
compared it to a number of related variables. In particular, we compared our scale to the five 
dimensions of the Big-Five personality scale (Gosling, Rentfrow and Swann, 2003) and to the 
two dimensions of the BIS/BAS scale (Carver and White, 1994) for positive and negative 
affectivity. To do so, we collected data by distributing questionnaires to the 77 executive 
education students of a prominent European business school, and 67 were willing to participate 
(87%). The results (see Table 3) of this analysis strongly paralleled the expectations of our 
theory as well as the findings of the prior studies conducted by means of other scales of 
regulatory focus (e.g., Gorman et al., 2012; Lanaj, Chang and Johnson, 2012). In particular, 
prevention focus was positively associated with behavioral inhibition and conscientiousness (p 
< .05) and neuroticism (p < .10), and it was negatively associated with extraversion (p < .05), 
agreeableness and openness to experience (p < .10). Likewise, promotion focus was positively 
associated with behavioral activation, extraversion, and openness to experience (p < .05) and 
agreeableness (p < .10). These results support further the validity of our regulatory focus scale. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------ 
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 Mediating Variables. Centralization items are based on the Hage and Aiken (1967) and 
Dewar, Whetten and Boje (1980) studies. The centralization scale examines the extent to which 
the members of an organizational unit can act autonomously from their managers, particularly 
when those managers are higher up in the hierarchy (α = .95). The connectedness scale is based 
on the Jaworski and Kohli (1993) study, and is used to analyze the extent to which members of 
an organizational unit are accessible regardless of their hierarchical level or position, and the 
extent to which informal communication is used in the organizational unit (α = .86). 
 Control Variables. We used a variety of control variables in order to rule out a number 
of potential alternative explanations to the effects observed in this study. First of all, we 
controlled for the median age, median tenure in firm and the median level of education in the 
organizational units. We used the median average of age, tenure in firm and education rather 
than the mean because the measurements were taken at the ordinal level of measurement 
(Stevens, 1951). Level of education tends to have a positive relationship with higher levels of 
cognitive abilities (Papadakis, Lioukas and Chambers, 1998), which may have an effect on the 
tendency towards exploratory innovation. Likewise, we controlled for age and tenure in firm 
for their potential effects on exploratory innovation through increased experience and 
familiarity with the context (e.g., Tushman and O'Reilly, 1996). Furthermore, using a prevalent 
heterogeneity measure based on Allison (1978), we also controlled for the diversity-related 
differences among the organizational units for median age, education and tenure. In other 
words, for instance, we did not only control for the effect of the median age in an organization 
unit, but also controlled for the effect of the organization being homogeneous or heterogeneous 
with respect to age. Indeed, diversity is known to be a primary factor affecting strategic 
decisions and tendencies (e.g., Frey, Lüthje and Haag, 2011; Yoo and Reed, 2015). We also 
controlled for the number of responding managers as an approximate indicator of size. Finally, 
the organizational units resided in one of three geographical locations. Hence, using two 
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dummy variables, we controlled for the region of the organizational unit. The third dummy 
variable was left out of the model as the benchmark variable. 
 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------ 
The correlation matrix is presented above. The correlations within the variables were 
for the most part in line with our expectations and with prior research. Promotion focus was 
positively correlated with connectedness (r = .30; p < .05) and exploratory innovation (r = .21; 
p < .10), and its correlation with centralization was negative (r = -.29; p < .05). Likewise, 
exploratory innovation was positively correlated with connectedness (r = .33; p < .01) and 
negatively correlated with centralization (r = -.35; p < .01). The correlations of prevention 
focus with these variables were not significant. Like the other studies which applied the 
regulatory focus theory in the context of organizations (Neubert et al., 2008; Wallace, Johnson 
and Frazier, 2009), we also found a positive significant correlation between promotion and 
prevention focus (r = .43; p < .01). In sum, the correlation matrix suggests that the correlations 
among the variables mostly conform to those reported in prior studies. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------ 
 Table 5 above shows the hierarchical OLS regression analyses we conducted on the 
exploratory innovation variable. We first checked the variance inflation factors (VIF) against 
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possible multicollinearity issues. The highest VIF value in our regression models was 3.67, 
which is well below the suggested cut-off point of 10 (Neter, Wasserman and Kutner, 1990), 
indicating that multicollinearity is not a problem in our analyses. Next, we went on to test the 
hypotheses. Model 2 of Table 5 demonstrates the significant positive effect of promotion focus 
(β = .32; p < .05) and the marginally significant negative effect of prevention focus (β = -.21; 
p = .11) of the management team on exploratory innovation of the organizational unit, 
supporting Hypothesis 1a and suggesting marginal support for Hypothesis 1b.  
Regarding Hypothesis 2, Model 3 shows that promotion focus of the management team 
had a positive effect on connectedness within the department (β = .37; p < .01) and that 
prevention focus had a negative effect (β = -.24; p < .05), verifying our predictions. 
Furthermore, in line with our expectations, Model 5 showed that the effect of connectedness 
on exploratory innovation was positive and significant (β = .34; p < .05), supporting 
Hypotheses 2a, 2b and 2c. Regarding Hypothesis 3, Model 4 shows that promotion focus has 
a negative relationship with centralization (β = -.37; p < .01), supporting Hypothesis 3a. In 
contrast, the effect of prevention focus on centralization was not significant (β = .18; p = .16). 
Therefore, Hypothesis 3b is not supported. Moreover, Model 5 shows that, in line with our 
predictions, centralization has a negative relationship to exploratory innovation of the 
organizational unit (β = -.28; p < .05). Therefore, Hypothesis 3c is supported. 
 After that, we decided to test whether centralization and connectedness mediate the 
relationships between the regulatory focus of a management team and the organizational unit’s 
exploratory innovation (Hypothesis 4). We did do so by using the bootstrapping method (Shrout 
and Bolger, 2002), which is a powerful technique for testing mediation models (i.e. Hayes, 
2009; MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West and Sheets, 2002). Recently, mediation with 
bootstrapping technique has also been used in management journals (e.g., Hmieleski, Cole and 
Baron, 2012; Walker, Bauer, Cole, Bernerth, Field and Short, 2012). In line with this, we used 
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a tool developed by Hayes (2009), which makes use of the bootstrapping technique. The 
mediation test with bootstrap analysis (1,000 samples; 95% confidence interval). Please see 
Table 6 below.  
 In line with the structure of our model and the results pertaining to the first three 
hypotheses, we examined three mediation paths: the indirect effect of promotion focus through 
connectedness, of promotion focus through centralization and of prevention focus through 
connectedness on exploratory innovation. Prevention focus through centralization was not a 
potential mediation path, as the main effect of prevention focus on centralization was found to 
be not significant. 
Regarding the first two of these mediation paths, the indirect effect of promotion focus 
through connectedness (Z = 2.02; p < .05) was significant, and by itself was sufficient to cause 
the direct effect of promotion focus on exploratory innovation to disappear (p = .18), implying 
full mediation. The indirect effect of promotion focus through centralization was also 
significant, although at a lower level of significance (Z = 1.88; p < .10). Still, it was sufficient 
to cause the direct effect to disappear (p = .14). Both variables individually being sufficient to 
mediate the relationship suggests that part of the effect was shared. In line with this, adding 
both mediators simultaneously into the equation decreased the level of significance of the 
indirect effect of promotion focus through both connectedness (Z = 1.71; p < .10) and 
centralization (Z = 1.56; p = .12), as the effect is shared to some extent. As expected, in this 
case the direct effect of promotion focus also disappeared (p = .38). In other words, 
connectedness and centralization not only individually, but also together fully mediated the 
relationship between promotion focus and exploratory innovation. 
Next, we moved on to examine the indirect negative effect of prevention focus on 
exploratory innovation. As explained previously we examined connectedness only as a 
potential mediator of this relationship. Because the direct effect of prevention focus on 
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exploratory innovation was marginally significant, its indirect effect was also marginally 
significant through connectedness (Z = -1.58; p = .11). However, when connectedness is added 
into the model, the marginally significant direct effect of prevention focus on exploratory 
innovation disappeared completely (p = .37). In other words, the marginally significant effect 
of prevention focus on exploratory innovation was mediated through connectedness. 
In sum, regarding Hypothesis 4, the significant positive effect of a management team’s 
promotion focus on its organizational unit’s exploratory innovation runs through the effects on 
centralization and connectedness. However, the negative effect of prevention focus runs 
through its effects on connectedness only. Therefore, together, these results suggest partial 
support for Hypothesis 4. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 6 about here 
------------------------------ 
 
Post-hoc Analyses 
To better understand whether promotion focus is tied to exploratory types of innovation 
only, we conducted a post-hoc analysis examining exploitative innovation as a separate 
independent variable. Exploitative innovations build on existing knowledge and extend 
existing products and services for existing customers (Benner and Tushman 2003). Results 
indicate that the direct effect of promotion focus on exploitative innovation was significant, 
also when both centralization and connectedness were added into the model (p < .05). While 
decentralization and connectedness mediate the relationship between promotion focus and 
exploration, they did not do so between promotion focus and exploitation. In other words, while 
promotion focus seems to affect positively both exploratory and exploitative innovation, the 
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relationship between promotion focus and exploitative innovation runs through different 
mechanisms that we do not yet understand, which suggests an important area of future research. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The impact of the management team on the pursuit of exploratory innovation has 
emerged as an important research theme in the exploratory innovation and upper-echelon 
literatures (e.g.  Alexiev et al., 2010; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2011; Papadakis and Barwise, 
2002; Talke et al., 2011). Particularly pressing are the questions as to why and how some 
management teams in the same firm increase the level of exploratory innovation, while others 
do not (Jansen et al., 2009; Keegan and Turner, 2002; Loufrani-Fedida and Saglietto, 2014; 
McDermott and O’Connor, 2002). In this paper, our contribution has been to examine these 
questions in new and important ways; using regulatory focus theory from the field of 
psychology (Higgins, 1997, 1998) has enabled us both to further conceptual understanding and 
to present empirically validated findings. 
More precisely, firstly we have contributed to the literatures on exploratory innovation 
(e.g. Alexiev et al., 2010; Benner and Tushman, 2003; Govindarajan et al., 2011), upper-
echelon (e.g. Hambrick, 2007; Carpenter et al, 2004) and regulatory focus (e.g. Gamache et al., 
2015; Kark and Van Dijk, 2007) by explaining and demonstrating the relationship between 
management team regulatory focus and exploratory innovation of the organizational units 
associated with the team. Our results indicate that the promotion focus of a unit’s management 
team positively relates to the unit’s exploratory innovation while the prevention focus has a 
marginally significant negative relationship to it. Secondly, contributing to the literatures 
mentioned above, we have explained and demonstrated how the regulatory focus of the 
management team of an organizational unit is reflected in the level of exploratory innovation 
within that unit, through the use of associated organizational coordination mechanisms. More 
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specifically, centralization and connectedness, considered to be two of the most important 
coordination mechanisms within an organization (i.e. Tsai, 2002), are found to act as mediators 
of the effects of the management team regulatory focus on the exploratory innovation of the 
associated organizational units. 
These two related contributions have a number of implications for theory and practice. 
First, while current innovation and upper-echelon studies have focused on demographic 
differences across management teams (e.g. Papadakis and Barwise, 2002; Talke et al., 2011) 
or have referred to concepts such as ‘gut feeling’ in managerial decision making (Sadler-Smith 
and Shefy, 2004) to explain differences across management teams, we have introduced a 
concept from the field of psychology which appears to offer a powerful explanation of why 
management teams from the same firm may differ in the extent to which they pursue 
exploratory innovations and in how they use organizational coordination mechanisms to bring 
about such innovations. In that sense, our study underlines for the upper-echelon and 
innovation literatures the importance of underlying psychological characteristics for 
understanding differences across management teams and associated outcomes (Bell, 2007; 
Miron-Spektor et al., 2011). In doing so, we also contribute to a recent study by Spanjol and 
colleagues (2011), which examines different types of product decisions in two-person teams. 
We might complement their study both theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, rather than 
touching upon various different types of product decisions, we focus on a specific aspect of 
product decisions – the level of exploratory innovation, and do so at the organizational unit 
level of analysis. Doing so allows us to examine not only the antecedent role of the management 
team’s regulatory focus, but also the factors mediating this relationship within the context of a 
large organization. Empirically, the study conducted by Spanjol et al (2011) was a business 
simulation with 124 undergraduate seniors. Although it was well-executed, the authors of that 
study argue that using undergraduate students in place of real managers may give rise to 
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limitations. In that sense, our study may be complementary as we conducted the study using 
748 managers of a multinational company. Moreover, this research was not conduct with 
dyadic teams formed with the purpose of a business study, but with larger management teams 
that have already been operational for a long time. All in all, one implication of this study is 
confirming, extending and providing external validity to the results of the study by Spanjol and 
colleagues (2011). 
Second, this study provides new and useful insights into the nature of the mediation 
path between the regulatory focus of a management team and exploratory innovation. In 
particular, this research shows that connectedness and centralization can fully explain the 
positive effect of promotion focus on exploratory innovation at the organizational unit level. 
Likewise, connectedness can also explain the marginally significant negative effect of 
prevention focus on exploratory innovation. Furthermore, of these two organizational 
coordination mechanisms, connectedness does not only better account for the effects of 
promotion focus on exploratory innovation, but is the only one that can account for the effects 
of both regulatory focus dimensions. In other words, our study brings connectedness forward 
as possibly the foremost mechanism in explaining the effects of a management team’s 
regulatory focus on its organizational unit’s exploratory innovation. 
Third, our findings also have implications for top or corporate management in terms of 
how they can influence the level of exploratory innovation in the organization’s units. During 
times of change and uncertainty, attempts by top management to exercise power in order to 
directly influence or change the strategic outcomes of units – such as their level of exploratory 
innovation – may be prone to failure because of resistance at the unit level, for example, or a 
lack of adequate internal and external contextual understanding at the top (e.g., Alexiev et al. 
2010; Damanpour, 1991; Keegan and Turner, 2002). In this sense, our study may provide 
insights into how the top management can influence such strategic outcomes in a more indirect 
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way, thereby avoiding the potentially negative effects of direct top-down interventions. That 
is, by shifting the regulatory focus of an organizational unit's management team the actual locus 
of strategic decision making, as well as the execution of such decisions, remains with the units’ 
management teams. The top management may shift a unit’s management team’s regulatory 
focus by deliberately changing the composition of the team, by framing their communication 
(i.e. written documents, vision, etc.) with the team in a particular regulatory focus (i.e. Weber 
and Mayer, 2011; Weber et al., 2011) or by implementing carefully selected incentive 
mechanisms (Brockner and Higgins, 2001; Shah, Higgins and Fridman, 1998). When the 
regulatory focus of an organizational unit's management team is changed, the team can then be 
expected to change its level of exploratory innovation accordingly, and the associated 
organizational coordination mechanisms. 
 Fourth, while some research indicates that many of the exploratory innovations 
intended by a unit’s management team will fail to come about (e.g., Jansen et al., 2009; Keegan 
and Turner, 2002; Loufrani-Fedida and Saglietto, 2014; McDermott and O’Connor, 2002), our 
research show that one main reason for this may be because the management team does not 
take into account the organizational coordination required. In this sense, our study underlines 
that both the formal hierarchical structure, most notably the level of centralization of decision 
making, and the more informal development of densely connected social relationships within 
the units matter for changing the levels of exploratory innovation (Lawson et al., 2009; Jansen 
et al., 2006). Moreover, our results suggest another explanation for the managerial problem of 
trying to generate exploratory innovation but being unable to do so. That is, where the top 
management tries to increase a unit’s exploratory innovation whilst imposing a prevention 
focus on the management team of the unit, they are unlikely to achieve higher levels of 
exploratory innovations. Based on the results of this study, we suggest the top management 
teams need to be consistent with their cues and messages. For instance, if a top management 
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team is asking the management team of an organizational unit to engage in more exploratory 
innovation, they should preferably frame this in a promotion-focused manner, stressing the 
potential gains and opportunities involved, rather than in a prevention-focused manner that 
stresses the potential failures and threats of not doing so (e.g. Weber and Mayer, 2011). 
    Fifth, our study provides an answer to the earlier calls in both the management and 
regulatory focus literatures for more research, particularly empirically validated, which uses 
the concept of regulatory focus within the domain of organizational behavior (i.e. Brockner 
and Higgins, 2001; Das and Kumar, 2010; Kark and Van Dijk, 2007; McMullen et al., 2009). 
In this sense, we have taken a step forward in advancing understanding of the interrelationships 
between the construct of regulatory focus and the organizational context. While there have been 
numerous studies in the regulatory focus literature that show the effect of organizational 
context on the individual or group (e.g., Brockner and Higgins, 2001; Rietzschel, 2011; 
Tuncdogan, van den Bosch and Volberda, 2015), our research has shown that the regulatory 
focus of a unit’s management team has an important influence on the unit’s organizational 
context, i.e. the extent to which the decision making structure is centralized and the extent to 
which the unit members are connected to each other by direct personal contacts. This finding 
is particularly useful for the emerging stream of literature that is aimed at better understanding 
the diffusion of a particular regulatory focus throughout the organization (e.g. McMullen et al., 
2009). Moreover, by incorporating regulatory focus theory into the literatures on exploratory 
innovation, we bring in a variable that can act as a bridge between different kinds of literatures. 
That is, because regulatory focus is a core psychological variable with many other 
psychological antecedents (i.e., Higgins, 1997), this study may provide an important step in 
creating greater understanding of how various aspects of human psychology affect 
organizational behavior and outcomes, namely those related to innovation and, consequently, 
to organizational performance. 
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Finally, we expand research on regulatory focus theory by testing whether management 
team regulatory focus affects the proclivity of units to undertake major strategic actions 
(Gamache et al., 2015), in this case exploratory innovation. We further theory and research on 
the impact of leader regulatory focus (Kark and Van Dijk, 2007); to date, empirical work on 
this topic has primarily considered non-executive leaders and individual outcomes as opposed 
to firm out-comes (Neubert, Kacmar, Carlson, Chonko, and Roberts, 2008). 
 
Limitations and Future Research 
 The findings of our study should be considered in light of the following limitations, 
which are also indicators of potential areas for future research. First, our data were collected at 
one company. The company is active in a dynamic and uncertain industry, the management 
teams of the units have decision-making autonomy regarding their unit’s level of exploratory 
innovation, and the firm is sufficiently large and internally diverse. These factors may indicate 
the potential of the generalizability of our results, as well as the boundary conditions. Hence, 
we propose that our research be complemented by future studies that focus more on breadth 
rather than depth for a complete view of the picture; such studies can sample many firms but 
fewer units from each firm. 
 A second limitation concerns the cross-sectional nature of our data which limits its 
claims about causality. One long-standing puzzle within the strategic management literature is 
the interplay between the organizational unit and the environment (i.e. Chandler, 1962); for 
instance, how should management teams of organizational units adjust their units to the 
environmental conditions so as to increase performance. Hence, future researchers could 
consider collecting longitudinal data to examine the interplay between changes in the 
environment and the regulatory focus of the management team which affects the organizational 
coordination mechanisms. Such research could clarify the extent to which regulatory focus 
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helps a management team adapt its organizational unit or organization to the surrounding 
environment, and the conditions under which it may start becoming detrimental to 
performance. 
 Thirdly, we focused in this paper on exploitative innovation. The post-hoc analysis 
suggests that promotion focus may also impact exploitative innovation, but through different 
mediating mechanisms. Investigating these issues further may offer interesting insights into 
how organization units may balance both types of innovation (Benner and Tushman, 2003; 
Raisch, 2008). 
Finally, to measure management team regulatory focus we constructed a new scale. In 
so doing, we took several steps to assess the scale’s validity and reliability. Future empirical 
research may improve the scale and further test its validity. 
To recap, in this study we examined how the regulatory focus of an organizational unit’s 
management team affected the unit’s exploratory innovation. Furthermore, we demonstrated 
the importance of decentralization and connectedness – two primary coordination mechanisms 
of the organizational unit – in mediating this relationship. By so doing, we took a further step 
to illuminate the micro-foundations of exploratory innovation from the perspectives of upper-
echelons and regulatory focus theories. 
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Table 1      
Items and Factor Analysis of the Scalesa           
 1 2 3 4 5 
Exploratory Innovation (α = .91)      
In our unit, we invent products and 
services for new markets 
.84 .05 .15 -.19 -.03 
In our unit, we experiment with new 
products and services in our markets. 
.88 .09 .03 -.19 .15 
In our unit, we experiment with products 
and services that are completely new to 
our unit. 
.82 .30 .04 -.07 .28 
In our unit, we frequently utilize 
opportunities in new markets. 
.79 .29 -.09 .01 .10 
 
     
Promotion Focus (α = .86)      
Talk enthusiastically about what needs to 
be accomplished 
.14 .84 .15 -.05 .02 
Articulate a compelling vision of the 
future 
.23 .82 .00 -.15 .12 
Suggest new ways of looking at how to 
complete assignments 
.20 .71 .40 -.14 .15 
Seek differing perspectives when solving 
problems 
.14 .70 .21 -.15 .22 
 
     
Prevention Focus (α = .82)      
Concentrate their attention on dealing 
with mistakes, complaints and failures 
.06 .19 .88 .01 -.04 
Focus attention on irregularities, 
mistakes, exceptions, and deviations 
from standards 
.02 .22 .79 .08 -.15 
Do not hesitate to interfere until 
problems become serious 
.00 .34 .70 -.09 -.18 
Show a firm belief in “if it ain’t broke, 
don’t fix it.” 
.03 -.17 .45 .07 .28 
 
     
Centralization (α = .95)      
A person in our unit who wants to make 
his own decisions would be quickly 
discouraged. 
-.07 -.13 -.07 .88 -.17 
Even small matters in our unit have to be 
referred to someone higher up for a final 
decision. 
-.04 -.15 -.02 .92 -.14 
Unit members need to ask their manager 
before they do almost anything. 
-.20 -.03 .07 .92 -.07 
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Most decisions people make here have to 
have their manager’s approval. 
-.12 -.12 .09 .91 -.08 
 
     
Connectedness (α = .86)      
In our unit, there is ample opportunity 
for informal “hall talk” among 
employees. 
.20 .02 -.15 -.01 .80 
In our unit, employees from different 
departments feel comfortable calling 
each other when the need arises. 
.06 .13 -.13 -.07 .86 
People in our unit are quite accessible to 
each other. 
-.03 .16 .16 -.22 .87 
In our unit, it is easy to talk with 
virtually anyone you need to, regardless 
of rank or position. 
.25 .18 -.01 -.30 .75 
 
     
Notes: a Principle Components Analysis with Varimax Rotation. 
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Table 2   
Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results   
    χ2 d.f. χ2 / d.f. TLIa CFIb AICc BICd SABICe 
Recommended values:   ≤ 3 ≥ .90 ≥ .90 
The model with the lowest AIC / BIC / SABIC 
value has the best fit 
 1 . Five-factor model (with item parcels) 36.14 25 1.45 .95 .97 1158.66 1225.69 1131.20 
 2 . Five-factor model (without item parcels) 213.87 142 1.51 .91 .92 2283.90 2391.14 2239.97 
 3. Four-factor model (Promotion and Prevention foci are 
combined together) 
275.54 146 1.89 .83 .86 2337.57 2435.88 2297.30 
 2. Three-factor model (Promotion and Prevention foci are 
combined, Centralization and Connectedness are combined) 
408.98 149 2.74 .67 .71 2465.01 2556.61 2427.48 
 5. Two-factor model (Promotion focus, Prevention focus, 
Centralization and Connectedness are combined) 
724.53 152 4.77 .29 .37 2774.56 2859.46 2739.78 
 6. One-factor model (Everything is combined) 556.58 151 3.69 .49 .55 2608.61 2695.74 2572.91 
Note: a TLI = Tucker-Lewis Index, b CFI = Comparative Fit Index, c AIC = Akaike, d BIC = Bayesian, e SABIC = Sample-Adjusted Bayesian 
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Table 3 
Correlations between the Developed Regulatory Focus Scale and Other Conceptually-Linked Variables       
  Mean Std. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Promotion Focus 5.57 .76  
       
2. Prevention Focus 3.91 1.04 -.02        
3. BIS 3.50 1.12 -.20† .35***       
4. BAS 5.11 .86 .35*** -.13 -.38***      
5. Extraversion 4.89 1.48 .46*** -.38*** -.35*** .39***     
6. Agreeableness 4.25 1.03 .23* -.23* -.06 .16 .29**    
7. Neuroticism 2.59 1.12 -.07 .21* .34*** -.21* -.06 -.19†   
8. Conscientiousness 5.37 .93 .17 .35*** -.10 .12 -.13 -.19† -.20†  
9. Openness to Experience 5.61 .87 .55*** -.23* -.11 .22* .33*** .25** -.01 -.11 
Notes: N = 67; † p < .15; * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 
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Correlation Matrix
 Mean Std. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1. Exploratory Innovation 4.61 .76 (.91)
2. Promotion Focus 4.90 .62 .21* (.86)
3. Prevention Focus 4.27 .64 -.07 .43*** (.82)
4. Centralization 3.43 .92 -.35*** -.29** -.01 (.95)
5. Connectedness 5.38 .55 .33*** .30** -.12 -.30** (.86)
6. Median Age 4.02 .93 .02 .06 .03 -.14 .26**
7. Median Level of Education 3.66 .55 .25** -.10 -.05 -.02 -.02 -42***
8. Median Tenure in Firm 4.20 .94 -.10 .06 .11 -.17 .19† .56*** -.09
9. Heterogeneity (Age) .34 .16 -.00 .08 .08 -.28** -.17 -.38*** .04 -.06
10. Heterogeneity (Education) .24 .17 -.18† -.05 .01 -.05 .06 .40*** -.72*** .06 -.06
11. Heterogeneity (Tenure) .19 .17 .18† -.07 .06 .20† -.28** -38*** -.02 -.54*** .08 .00
12. Size 10.84 10.34 -.14 -.15 .05 .97 -.09 .09 .23* .26** -.01 -.02 -.10
13. Region 1 .29 .46 -.07 -.05 .10 .07 -.43*** -.38*** -.22† -.34*** .15 .01 .39*** -.29**
14. Region 2 .57 .50 .10 .02 -.05 -.12 .16 .23* .36*** .45*** -.08 -.18† -.28** .39*** -.73***
Table 4
Notes: N = 69; † p < .15; * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01; Cronbach's α values of the scales are given in parantheses.
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  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Dependent Variable: 
Exploratory 
Innovation 
Exploratory 
Innovation 
Connectedness Centralization 
Exploratory 
Innovation 
Exploratory 
Innovation 
       
Independent Variables       
Promotion Focus  .32** .37*** -.37***  .12 
Prevention Focus  -.21† -.24** .18  -.09 
       
Mediating Variables       
Centralization     -.28** -.26** 
Connectedness     .34** .30** 
       
Control Variables       
Median Age .41** .41** -.03 -.36* .32* .33* 
Median Tenure in Firm -.09 -.05 .18 .03 -.12 -.10 
Median Level of Education .45** .54*** .11 -.36* .37** .42** 
Heterogeneity (Age) .11 .09 -.13 -.38*** .03 .03 
Heterogeneity (Tenure) .28* .31** -.03 .14 .35*** .36*** 
Heterogeneity (Education) -.01 .07 .09 -.23 -.05 -.02 
Size -.25* -.19† -.12 .02 -.17 -.15 
Region 1 .01 .07 -.57*** -.27 .17 .17 
Region 2 .07 .05 -.34* -.15 .13 .11 
       
R-squared .22 .30 .40 .30 .42 .43 
Adjusted R-squared .10 .16 .28 .17 .31 .29 
ANOVA F 1.85* 2.20** 3.46*** 2.26** 3.72*** 3.15*** 
Notes: Standardized coefficients reported; N = 69; † p < .15; * p < .10; ** p =< .05; *** p < .01 
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Table 6        
Indirect Effects with Bootstrapping  
 Effect Boot SE Boot LLCI 
Boot 
ULCI Z p (Model) 
p (Direct 
Effect)a 
Prevention focus through connectedness 
-.11 .08 -.31 .001 -1.58 .11† .11†/.37 
 
         
Promotion focus through connectedness 
.17 .10 .03 .38 2.02 .04** .02**/.18 
 
         
Promotion focus through centralization 
.15 .09 .03 .37 1.88 .06* .02**/.14† 
 
         
Promotion focus through connectedness 
and centralization (simultaneously)b .14/.12 .09/.07 .01/.01 .31/.29 1.71/1.56 .09*/.12† .02**/.38 
          
N = 69, based on 1000 bootstrap samples. † p < .15; * p < .10; ** p < .05 
a Direct effect before/after the mediator variables are added       
b Result for connectedness / Result for centralization       
 
 
